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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The theory that an unregulated marketplace of ideas will promote 
truth holds a curiously ambiguous position in contemporary free speech 
jurisprudence.  On the one hand, it is a rationale for freedom of 
expression frequently invoked by the United States Supreme Court.1  It 
 
*Dan Cracchiolo Chair in Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, 
Arizona State University.  I am grateful to Vince Blasi, Thomas Healy, and Arthur 
Hellman for their helpful comments and suggestions and to law students Lauren Malm 
and Emiley Pagrabs and librarian Tara Mospan for their valuable research assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (quoting FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)) (referring to “the First Amendment’s 
purpose ‘to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail’”); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 464 (1995) (“Federal 
employees who write for publication in their spare time have made significant 
contributions to the marketplace of ideas.”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (“[T]he government’s ability to 
impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may 
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”); Members of the 
City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (“[T]here are some 
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has been referred to as “[t]he most influential argument supporting the 
constitutional commitment to freedom of speech,”2 as well as “[t]he 
most familiar argument for freedom of speech.”3  On the other hand, this 
rationale has long been trenchantly criticized in the scholarly literature.  
Nearly thirty-five years ago, Professor Christopher Wonnell noted the 
“impressive” number of constitutional scholars who “have rejected as 
false or unproven the central linkage between free speech and truth.”4  
In the ensuing decades, the litany of scholars skeptical of the 
marketplace of ideas rationale has grown steadily.5 
 
purported interests—such as a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an 
unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the 
marketplace of ideas—that are so plainly illegitimate that they would immediately 
invalidate the rule.”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
183 (1973) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)) (In 1919, “Mr. 
Justice Holmes sounded what has since become a dominant theme in applying the First 
Amendment to the changing problems of our Nation.  ‘[T]he ultimate good,’ he declared, 
‘is better reached by free trade in ideas,’ and ‘the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .’”); Red Lion Broad. 
Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . 
.”).  For a more comprehensive compilation of Supreme Court cases invoking the 
marketplace of ideas rationale, see Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 825 n.7 (2008); Rodney A. Smolla, The Meaning of the 
“Marketplace of Ideas” in First Amendment Law, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 437, 439–41 (2019).  
I have not been able to find a study of the frequency with which the United States 
Supreme Court has invoked various rationales for freedom of speech; however, my 
distinct impression is that the marketplace of ideas rationale is the free speech rationale 
most often invoked by the Court. 
 2 William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment 
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995). 
 3 Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130 (1989); see 
also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15 (1982) (referring to the 
marketplace of ideas rationale as “the predominant and most persevering” of all the 
arguments for free speech). 
 4 Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
669, 672–73 (1986).  Wonnell’s list comprises Professors Lawrence Alexander & Paul 
Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1319, 1349 (1984); 
C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 
967–90 (1978); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 549 (1977); Benjamin S. Duval, Jr., Free Communication of Ideas and 
the Quest for Truth, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 188–94 (1972); Stanley Ingber, The 
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1984); Martin H. Redish, 
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 616–19 (1982); SCHAUER, supra note 3,  
at 15–34. 
 5 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, 
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 696 (2006); Paul H. 
Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951, 962 (1997); 
Darren Bush, The “Marketplace of Ideas”: Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote’s 
Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1144–45 (2000); Murray Dry, The First Amendment 
Freedoms, Civil Peace and the Quest for Truth, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 325, 326–28 (1998); 
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987); Alvin I. Goldman & 
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Last year, Professor Joseph Blocher, a participant in this 
Symposium, published a comprehensive evaluation of the marketplace 
of ideas rationale.6  Blocher usefully distinguishes between the 
“internal” critique of this rationale, which posits that unregulated 
speech does not maximize truth, and the “external” one, which 
maintains that truth is not the central value of the First Amendment.  He 
concludes that “the marketplace model is in trouble” on both scores, “as 
scholars and others have justifiably pointed out its inability to deliver 
the value—truth—that it is supposedly designed to maximize” and “as 
competitor theories rooted in autonomy and democracy start to claim 
more and more of the territory.”7 
In a highly influential “internal critique” of the marketplace of ideas 
rationale published in 1984, Professor Stanley Ingber explained that 
under this rationale “[c]itizens must be capable of making 
determinations that are both sophisticated and intricately rational if 
they are to separate truth from falsehood.”8  Contrary to this key 
assumption, however, Ingber observed that “[o]n the whole, current and 
historical trends have not vindicated the market model’s faith in the 
rationality of the human mind.”9  Since then, a host of social science 
studies have documented how cognitive biases interfere with the ability 
of human beings to perceive truth.  In an article reviewing many of the 
leading studies, Professor Derek Bambauer concludes that the key 
assumption of the marketplace of ideas that “with time, we will arrive at 
more truthful conclusions,” is “not compatible with research regarding 
cognitive biases.”10  To the contrary, “[o]ur perceptual filters undercut 
the conclusion that more information leads to better decisions. . . .  
[Rather,] we cling stubbornly to facts thoroughly disproved.  Even in 
communications as vital and carefully evaluated as political 
 
James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996); 
Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test of Truth: The “Marketplace of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 
89 TUL. L. REV. 383, 432 (2014); Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1531 (2019); Alberto Bernabe Riefkohl, Freedom of the Press 
and the Business of Journalism: The Myth of Democratic Competition in the Marketplace 
of Ideas, 67 REV. JURIS. U. P.R. 447, 455 (1998); Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People 
in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV. 761, 776 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, 
Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 668 (1987); 
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 
349 (1991); Tona Trollinger, Reconceptualizing the Free Speech Clause: From a Refuse of 
Dualism to the Reason of Holism, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 137, 155 (1994).   
 6 Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 HARV. L. REV. 439 (2019). 
 7 Id. at 458–59. 
 8 Ingber, supra note 4, at 7. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Bambauer, supra note 5, at 696. 
WEINSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:58 PM 
138 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:135 
information, our biases greatly affect our decisions.”11  In short, the 
marketplace of ideas “does not describe how humans behave.”12  And 
the already dubious premise that unregulated speech produces truth 
has been further undercut by the increasing role of online sources of 
information in American society, an environment “besieged by false 
news and intentional misinformation” and where Americans have 
become “increasingly siloed in their own echo chambers . . . such that 
counterspeech may be of limited effect.”13 
With regard to the external critique, I have previously explained 
why the marketplace of ideas rationale is a particularly poor candidate 
for the core, let alone an important, First Amendment norm.14  
Concerning the internal critique, in light of the numerous trenchant 
critiques just mentioned, little would be served by my “piling on” with 
yet another article arguing that unregulated speech is unlikely to 
maximize truth discovery.15  So rather than offering another 
comprehensive critique of the marketplace of ideas rationale, I will 
focus instead on a specific misstep that the United States Supreme Court 
made in invoking this rationale to extend First Amendment protection 
to knowing misstatements of fact, otherwise known as lies.16 
In United States v. Alvarez,17 the Court in a 6-3 decision invalidated 
on First Amendment grounds the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that 
criminalized falsely claiming that one had been awarded a military 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Nunziato, supra note 5, at 1527–28. 
 14 See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American 
Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 502 (2011).  In Part III.D. of this Article, I briefly 
add to this external critique by showing how the two major competing free speech 
theories, autonomy and democracy, provide a much better explanation than does the 
marketplace of ideas for protecting lies made in public discourse. 
 15 I generally agree that “[j]ust as we are properly skeptical about our own power 
always to distinguish truth from falsity, so should we be even more skeptical of the 
power of any governmental authority to do it for us.”  SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 34.  
Accord Ingber, supra note 4, at 7 n.26 (“[T]he political state may be an especially 
unsuitable body to make the determination of what is true and what is false.”).  For not 
only are governmental actors subject to the usual cognitive biases documented by social 
scientists, but to political bias as well and thus are likely to suppress speech that 
threatens their power or favored policies.  This observation, however, does not save the 
marketplace of ideas rationale from the internal critique.  As argued in Part III.D. of this 
Article, while some forms of government regulation will impair truth discovery, other 
interventions will likely promote truth discovery.  Thus even when the potential for 
government regulation of speech to impair truth discovery is accounted for, the basic 
assumption of the marketplace of ideas rationale that the net effect of unregulated 
speech is the promotion of truth discovery is unverified. 
 16 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 17 Id. 
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honor.18  The decision comprised three opinions: a plurality opinion by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor; a concurring 
opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Elena Kagan; and a 
dissent by Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas.  Invoking Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous 
dissent that this Symposium commemorates, the plurality opinion held 
that, as a general matter, the First Amendment prohibits government 
from punishing even knowingly false factual statements.  The 
concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed, asserting that lies should 
not be afforded such a broad First Amendment protection.  Both of these 
opinions would, however, extend First Amendment protection to 
knowingly false factual statements on matters of public concern.19  And, 
as did the plurality, both of these decisions invoked the marketplace of 
ideas as justification for First Amendment protection of lies.20 
Part II of this Article describes the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
prior to Alvarez regarding First Amendment protection of false 
statements of fact.21  It demonstrates that the prevailing view was that 
false factual statements have no inherent constitutional value, for truth 
promotion or otherwise, but are sometimes afforded strategic 
protection to safeguard speech with constitutional value.  It also 
documents that knowing falsehoods were deemed particularly inimical 
to constitutional values and thus were not entitled to even instrumental 
protection.  Part III then discusses in sections A, B, and C, respectively, 
the plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions in Alvarez.  This 
discussion pays particular attention to each opinion’s invocation of the 
marketplace of ideas rationale for the protection of false factual 
statements, including knowingly false ones.  It reveals how little 
relevance this rationale has to the issues presented in this case.  Section 
D of Part III then posits two free speech values far more pertinent to the 
case than the marketplace of ideas.  Part IV concludes the Article by 
lamenting the undue influence that the marketplace of ideas continues 
to have on American free speech jurisprudence.  
 
 18 18 U.S.C. § 704(b). 
 19 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 731–32 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 20 Id. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 746 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 21 By statements of fact, I mean descriptive statements about nature or society as 
opposed to assertions of values or norms.  Accord Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First 
Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 900–01 (2010). 
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II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S PRE-ALVAREZ JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF LIES AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Prior to its decision in United States v. Alvarez, the Court had often 
stated that false statements of fact had no inherent constitutional value; 
rather, such statements were sometimes afforded instrumental 
protection to shield speech with First Amendment value.  For instance, 
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court declared that “there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.  Neither the intentional 
lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in 
‘uninhibited, robust and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”22  The 
Court continued by explaining that “[a]lthough the erroneous statement 
of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless 
inevitable in free debate.”23  Therefore, “to assure to the freedoms of 
speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful 
exercise,”24 it “has extended a measure of strategic protection to 
defamatory falsehood.”25  The Court had long made clear, however, that 
no such “strategic protection” was appropriate for knowingly false 
factual statements.  Thus, in a 1964 decision, the Court stated that while 
instrumental reasons might justify the extension of protection to the 
carelessly made false assertion of fact in public debate, “the use of the 
known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic 
government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or 
political change is to be effected.”26  For that reason, “[c]alculated 
falsehood falls into that class of utterances” that “do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.”27   
 
 22 Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 
(1968) (“Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, 
and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation.”). 
 23 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
 24 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (emphasis added). 
 27 Id.  Along with the outright lie, the Court included “the false statement made with 
reckless disregard of the truth” as among those categories of speech that “do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.”  Id.  Accord N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 
(1964) (allowing public officials to recover for libel if they can show that the defamatory 
statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”).  To prove “reckless disregard” in a defamation suit, it must 
be shown that the defendant had a “high degree of awareness of their probable falsity,” 
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, or, similarly, “serious doubts as to the truth” of the defamatory 
statement, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).  Under this definition, 
falsehoods made with “reckless disregard” for the truth are sufficiently close to a 
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Two related points are in order regarding the relationship between 
the marketplace of ideas and knowingly false factual statements in the 
Court’s pre-Alvarez jurisprudence.  First, the Court most frequently 
invoked the marketplace of ideas rationale in cases concerning 
normative statements such as “opinion” and “ideas,” not factual 
assertions.  Second, when the Court did speak of the marketplace of 
ideas in cases involving factual statements, it explained that this 
rationale was inapplicable to false statements of fact. 
Justice Holmes’ renowned Abrams dissent, which introduced the 
marketplace of ideas rationale into First Amendment jurisprudence,28 
speaks of “[p]ersecution for the expression of opinions,” “fighting faiths,” 
“free trade in ideas,” “expression of opinions that we loathe and believe 
to be fraught with death,” and the “creed that [the defendants] avow,”29 
not of factual statements.30  Indeed, at the conclusion of his dissent, after 
 
knowingly false misstatement that I will not in this Article distinguish them from 
outright lies. 
 28 Although this dissent represents the first instance in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence of what was to become known as the “marketplace of ideas” rationale, 
Holmes makes no mention of a “marketplace” but rather to the “competition of the 
market” and to “free trade in ideas.”  The first reference to a “marketplace” of ideas in a 
Supreme Court opinion is in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“Like the publishers of newspapers, magazines, or books, this publisher 
bids for the minds of men in the market place of ideas.”).  According to Professor Vincent 
Blasi, the first published use of the term “marketplace of ideas” was so far as he could 
determine in a letter to the New York Times, referring to “men and ideas competing in 
the market place of ideas where public opinion is formed.”  See Vincent Blasi, Holmes 
and the Marketplace of Ideas, SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 n.41 (2004) (quoting from Letter from 
David M. Newbold to N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 1935)).  Interestingly, another statement often 
attributed to Holmes—free speech not protecting “falsely shouting ‘Fire!’ in a crowded 
theater,” see, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 30 (emphasis added)—also changes what 
Holmes actually wrote.  See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a 
theatre and causing a panic.”). 
 29 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 30 The Espionage Act had (and still has) a provision making it a crime while the 
United States is at war to “willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with 
intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the 
United States or to promote the success of its enemies.”  18 U.S.C. § 2388(a).  For 
discussion of a case brought under this provision, see infra note 34.  The defendants in 
Abrams were not, however, charged with violating this provision.  Rather, they were 
charged under different provisions of the Act with conspiracy to “unlawfully utter, print, 
write and publish . . . ‘disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of 
government of the United States,’ . . . language ‘intended to bring the form of government 
of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute’ . . . [and] language 
‘intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in said war;’” 
and with “unlawfully and willfully, by utterance, writing, printing and publication to 
urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production of things and products, to wit, 
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stating that “[o]nly the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous 
to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any 
exception to the sweeping command, ‘Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech,’” Holmes specifies that “[o]f course, I 
am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were 
all that were uttered here.”31  Similarly, Justice Louis Brandeis’ 
influential Whitney concurrence, which Holmes joined, described free 
speech as “means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth” and stated that “discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine.”32 
As Professor Frederick Schauer has usefully documented, for “the 
first half of the twentieth century, the issue that dominated the 
foreground” of First Amendment jurisprudence “was advocacy and not 
description.”33  Although this advocacy “was replete with inflammatory 
and exaggerated factual assertions about capitalist bosses, international 
arms cartels, and political [and] economic conspiracies, the basic issue 
was repeatedly one of antiwar, antidraft, prounion, and anticapitalist 
advocacy.”34  In the second half of the twentieth century, the Court 
 
ordnance and ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.”  
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617. 
 31 Id. at 630–31.  In this regard, it is worth noting that the two most influential works 
arguing that free expression will produce truth, JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) and 
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA—A SPEECH FOR UNLICENSED PRINTING (1644), focused on 
normative statements such as political ideas, moral claims and religious doctrine, not 
factual assertions.  See Schauer, supra note 21, at 904–05; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 (2012).  Holmes 
had long been familiar with Mill’s works, but at the urging of his friend Harold Laski, a 
young lecturer of history at Harvard University, he re-read On Liberty early in 1919.  See 
THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGES HIS MIND—AND 
CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 98 (2013). 
 32 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also 
id. at 376–77 (in discussing when “advocacy of lawbreaking” may constitutionally be 
punished, Brandeis argues that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
 33 Schauer, supra note 21, at 906. 
 34 Id.  While Schauer is correct that in the first half of the twentieth century, the issue 
that dominated the First Amendment jurisprudence “was advocacy and not 
description,” there were cases involving prosecution for the making of false statement 
of fact.  For instance, in Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920), the Court upheld 
the conviction of several defendants charged with making false statements in violation 
of the provision of the Espionage Act.  Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, 
dissented.  Significantly, Brandeis does not suggest that the First Amendment protects 
knowingly false statements of fact that can impair the nation’s war effort.  Rather, he 
objected that “the government did not attempt to prove that any statement made in any 
of the news items published in the [newspaper] was false in fact,” but relied merely on 
certain minor variations from the sources from which it was translated.  Id. at 486–87 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).  He also thought that even if these impugned statements could 
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extended some protection to statements constituting defamation, 
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as 
well as to commercial advertising.  As a result, the constitutional 
protection of factual statements became more of a focus of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
In a watershed 1976 decision, the Court considered whether to 
afford some measure of First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech.35 This sharply raised the issue of whether speech that “does ‘no 
more than propose a commercial transaction’”36 had any relevance at all 
to the marketplace of ideas.37  Over Justice William Rehnquist’s 
strenuous objection,38 the Court held that “‘the relationship of speech to 
the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in 
the marketplace of ideas.’”39  But despite finding truthful commercial 
advertising to have some purchase in the marketplace of ideas, and, 
therefore, worthy of limited First Amendment protection, the Court 
deemed that rationale inapplicable to false or even misleading 
commercial speech.40  It thus has consistently held such expression to 
be categorically without First Amendment protection.41   
In a landmark defamation case, the Court more generally expressed 
the view that the marketplace of ideas rationale was simply not germane 
to false factual statements: “Under the First Amendment,” the Court 
 
be considered false, they “could not have promoted the success of our enemies” and, 
therefore, were “impotent to produce the evil against which the statute aimed.”  Id.  
at 493.  Allowing “such harmless additions to or omissions from news items” to be 
criminalized, Brandeis warned, “will doubtless discourage criticism of the policies of the 
government.”  Id. at 494.  
 35 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
 36 Id. at 762 (citations omitted).  
 37 See Smolla, supra note 1. 
 38 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 39 Id. at 760; see also id. at 762 (commercial advertising is not “so removed from any 
exposition of ideas, and from truth, science, morality, and arts in general . . . that it lacks 
all protection.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 40 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–
64 (1980) (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the 
informational function of advertising.  Consequently, there can be no constitutional 
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the 
public about lawful activity.”); see also id. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the 
world of political advocacy and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a 
‘fraudulent’ idea. . . . [But] [t]he notion that more speech is the remedy to expose 
falsehood and fallacies is wholly out of place in the commercial bazaar . . . .”). 
 41 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495–98 (1996); Peel v. 
Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); In re R.M.J., 
455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 771. 
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explained, “there is no such thing as a false idea.”42  For the correction of 
“pernicious” ideas, we instead depend “on the competition of other 
ideas.”43  In contrast, “there is no constitutional value in false statements 
of fact.”44  Indeed, in its first case dealing with intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and the First Amendment, the Court explained that 
false statements of fact were positively inimical to the marketplace of 
ideas rationale because “they interfere with the truthseeking function of 
the marketplace of ideas.”45  And as noted at the beginning of this Part, 
while carelessly made false factual statements were sometimes 
extended a measure of strategic protection, knowingly false statements 
were deemed categorically devoid of First Amendment protection.46 
In light of this jurisprudence, one would have expected the Court in 
Alvarez to confirm that knowing misstatements of fact were of no 
constitutional value and were, at most, entitled to strategic protection 
to guard speech with constitutional value.  But as I shall now discuss, a 
majority of the Court, especially the plurality, took a very different tack.  
III.  UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ, PROTECTION OF LIES AND THE MARKETPLACE 
OF IDEAS 
When introducing himself as a board member of a water district, 
Xavier Alvarez made the knowingly false claim that he held the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.47  For making this statement, Alvarez 
was convicted under the Stolen Valor Act,48 which criminalized falsely 
claiming that one had been awarded a military honor.49  In a 6-3 
decision, the Court invalidated the Act on First Amendment grounds.  
There was sharp disagreement among the three opinions about the level 
of First Amendment scrutiny to be applied to the Stolen Valor Act.  One 
 
 42 Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
 43 Id. at 339–40. 
 44 Id. at 340.  Somewhat inconsistent with this view is the statement in N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 that “[e]ven a false 
statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it 
brings about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error.’”). 
 45 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 46 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 47 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2012). 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2019). 
 49 The Act did not expressly require that the speaker know that the claim was false.  
The Government, however, argued that the Act nevertheless required proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of such knowledge, Brief for United States at 17, and both the 
concurrence and dissent accepted that construction.  See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 732 
(Breyer, J. concurring) and id. at 740 (Alito, J. dissenting); see also id. (asserting that the 
plurality, which did not discuss the issue, “seemingly accept[s]” this position). 
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thing that all three decisions agreed upon, however, was that the 
marketplace of ideas rationale justifies the protection of a fairly broad 
category of lies.  There is much to criticize in the Court’s handling of this 
case, particularly the plurality’s invocation of strict scrutiny, which I will 
discuss.  In light of the theme of this Symposium, however, I will focus 
on each of the three opinions’ invocation of the marketplace of ideas 
rationale.  
A.  The Plurality Opinion 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, begins its First Amendment 
analysis by declaring that “[a]s a general matter, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”50  Rather, he 
explains, “content-based restrictions on speech are allowed, as a general 
matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories 
of expression long familiar to the bar.”51  Kennedy then notes that 
“[a]bsent from those few categories where the law allows content-based 
regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment 
for false statements.”52  Because the Stolen Valor Act penalizes speakers 
for the content of their speech, it must be subject to the “most exacting 
scrutiny.”53   
To survive this exceedingly demanding test, the government must 
show that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”54  The 
plurality seemed to assume that protecting the integrity of military 
honors, particularly the Congressional Medal of Honor, was a 
compelling interest.55  Nonetheless, it found the Stolen Valor Act could 
not survive strict scrutiny because, among other reasons, “[t]he 
 
 50 Id. at 716. 
 51 Id. at 717.  The exceptions noted by Justice Kennedy are “advocacy intended, and 
likely, to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to 
criminal conduct, so-called ‘fighting words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats, and 
speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to 
prevent.”  
 52 Id. at 718.  Contrary to this claim, as discussed in supra note 27 and accompanying 
text, the Court had previously held that the “[c]alculated falsehood falls into that class of 
utterances” that “do not enjoy constitutional protection.”  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 75 (1964).  Garrison even cites Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942), the case that introduced into American free speech jurisprudence the 
categorical exclusion of certain types of speech from First Amendment protection.   
 53 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724. 
 54 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
 55 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709. 
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Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech 
would not suffice to achieve its interest” in preventing false statements 
from diluting the value of military awards.56  At this point in the plurality 
opinion, Justice Kennedy quotes the seminal phrase from Holmes’ 
dissent that this Symposium commemorates: “The theory of our 
Constitution,” Justice Kennedy declared, “is ‘that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.’”57  Kennedy then explains that this is so because “suppression 
of speech by the government can make exposure of falsity more difficult, 
not less so.”58   
There are two serious defects with the plurality’s handling of the 
difficult and important question presented in this case.  The first is the 
holding that strict scrutiny applies to the regulation of intentional 
factual misstatements unless the lies at issue happen to fall within one 
of “the few historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar 
to the bar.”59  The second is the claim that such broad-based protection 
of lies, including factual statements such as those involved in this case 
whose falsity can readily be demonstrated, will lead to the finding of 
truth. 
I have long been critical of what I have called the “all-inclusive 
approach” to speech protection.60  Under this approach, all content-
based speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, and thus “near-
automatic condemnation,”61 unless the regulated speech is among the 
few categories of speech historically excluded from First Amendment 
protection.  It is problematic enough to the extent it is meant to afford, 
with a few narrow exceptions, virtually irrebuttable First Amendment 
protection to all truthful speech.62  It is even more so to the extent it 
 
 56 Id. at 726. 
 57 Id. at 728 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)).  The full sentence from which Justice Kennedy quotes reads: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out. 
Id. 
 58 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 728. 
 59 See id. at 717. 
 60 See Weinstein, supra note 14. 
 61 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 62 See Weinstein, supra note 14, at 492 noting “the large range of speech regulated 
on account of its content, all without a hint of interference from the First Amendment,” 
including “securities, antitrust, labor, copyright, food and drug, and health and safety 
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purports to provide such protection to negligent factual 
misstatements.63  But it borders on judicial malpractice to purport to 
also afford, as did the plurality, such protection to all knowingly false 
factual statements not fitting into a few narrow categories of expression, 
including statements, such as involved in the case at hand, which can 
easily, conclusively, and uncontroversially be shown to be false. 
As discussed in Part II, prior to Alvarez, the clearly prevalent view 
reflected in the Court’s free speech jurisprudence was that false factual 
statements had no inherent constitutional value, in terms of truth 
promotion or otherwise, but were sometimes strategically afforded 
protection to provide “breathing space” for speech with constitutional 
value; and that knowingly false statements are inimical to free speech 
values, particularly the search for truth.  Consistent with this sensible 
approach to protecting false factual statements, the scrutiny applied to 
a law prohibiting intentional misstatements of fact should be one that 
provides such “breathing space” to speech having First Amendment 
value.  This is precisely the test that the Government proposed in 
Alvarez: 
Because false factual statements are entitled only to limited 
instrumental protection, the Court has never applied strict 
scrutiny to a restriction on such statements.  Rather, it has 
approved content-based restrictions on false factual 
statements . . . when the restriction in question is supported 
by a strong government interest and provides adequate 
‘breathing space’ for fully protected speech.64 
Unfortunately, the plurality failed to give serious consideration to 
the Government’s sensible suggestion, firmly grounded in precedent, for 
dealing with false factual statements.  Instead, the plurality itself made 
a false factual statement by mischaracterizing the Government’s 
argument as contending for a “categorical rule” that “false statements 
 
laws, together with the array of speech regulated by the common law,” such as contract 
formation.   
 63 Will, for instance, malpractice claims against lawyers, accountants, and doctors 
for rendering negligent advice now be subject to “strict scrutiny”?  What about suits 
against manufacturers for negligently providing incorrect instructions on how to use its 
project?  Is providing recovery, for instance, for a slightly discolored carpet resulting 
from such deficient instructions really a “compelling interest”?  
 64 Brief of United States at 20–21, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 
6019906 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)) [hereinafter Brief 
of the United States].  Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., a participant in this 
Symposium, was counsel of record on this brief and argued the case in the Supreme 
Court on behalf of the United States. 
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receive no First Amendment protection.”65  Having built this strawman, 
the plurality then summarily demolished it.  It also mischaracterized 
and curtly dismissed an approach for dealing with knowingly false 
factual statements that Professor Eugene Volokh and I urged in an amici 
brief we filed in that case.66  Immediately after mischaracterizing the 
Government’s argument as contending that “false statements have no 
value and hence no First Amendment protection,”67 Justice Kennedy 
adds: “See also Brief for Eugene Volokh et al. as Amici Curiae 2–11.”68  
Contrary to the implication of this citation, we did not contend that false 
statements generally are entitled to no First Amendment protection.  
Rather, we urged the Court to “treat knowing falsehoods as a categorical 
exception to First Amendment protection.”69  But even with respect to 
such “calculated falsehoods,”70 we explained that there should be “some 
limitations” to such categorical exclusion.  We noted, for instance, that 
there should be protection for knowingly false statements “about the 
government, science, and history,” so as “to avoid an undue chilling 
effect on true factual statements, statements of opinion, or other 
constitutionally valuable expression.”71 
The plurality’s approach to knowing falsehoods forebodes two 
unfortunate consequences for First Amendment doctrine.  First, it 
threatens to impede legitimate regulatory goals by protecting speech 
with no First Amendment value even when its prohibition will not chill 
speech with such value.  Less obviously but more insidiously, such gross 
overprotection of knowingly false statements of fact through the 
application of strict scrutiny will likely reduce the protection that 
current doctrine affords speech with First Amendment value.  In our 
amici brief, Professor Volokh and I offered a long list of knowingly false 
 
 65 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719 (emphasis added); see also id. at 718 (stating that the 
Government contends “that false statements have no value and hence no First 
Amendment protection.”).  Justice Kennedy not only mischaracterized the Government’s 
position in this way, but also failed to acknowledge that the Government left open the 
possibility that, under certain circumstances, even knowingly false statements might be 
entitled to limited First Amendment protection.  See Brief of United States at 18 (“This 
Court has long held that knowingly false statements of fact like those prohibited by [the 
Stolen Valor Act] are entitled, at most, only to limited First Amendment protection, and 
only to the extent necessary to ensure that restrictions on false factual statements do 
not unduly inhibit fully protected speech.”). 
 66 Brief of Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6179424 [hereinafter Brief of 
Volokh and Weinstein]. 
 67 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Brief of Volokh and Weinstein at 2 (emphasis added). 
 70 Id. at 22. 
 71 Id. at 2. 
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statements of fact that are currently prohibited, for the most part 
uncontroversially.  These include (1) knowingly false defamatory 
statements, (2) perjury, (3) fraudulent attempts to obtain money, (4) 
knowing falsehood constituting intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, (5) trade libel and slander of title, (6) unsworn knowingly false 
statements to government officials, (7) knowing falsehoods likely to 
provoke public panic, (8) knowingly falsely representing oneself as a 
government official, (9) knowingly falsely representing oneself as 
having a particular university degree or professional license, and (10) 
knowingly providing a false social security number.72 
If challenged on First Amendment grounds, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, will be strongly inclined to uphold these perfectly 
reasonable prohibitions and will likely find a way to do so.73  But 
adopting the Alvarez plurality’s approach will pose a dilemma.  None of 
these types of expression are among the “few historic and traditional 
categories of expression” that have been deemed devoid of First 
Amendment protection.74  And they all prohibit speech because of its 
content.  Accordingly, under the plurality’s approach, all these laws 
must be subjected to “most exacting scrutiny.”75  But there’s the rub.  
Strict scrutiny in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has been 
 
 72 Id. at 3–11. 
 73 Thus, the plurality opinion goes out of its way to confirm the constitutionality of 
three examples of knowingly false statements punishable under federal law: false 
statements made to law enforcement officials, perjury, and false representations that 
one is speaking on behalf of government.  See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720.  It is 
understandable that the plurality did not want to imply that laws punishing lies such as 
these that threaten the “integrity of Government processes” are “vulnerable” to First 
Amendment challenge.  Id. at 721.  The problem is that none of the “narrow categories” 
of speech on the plurality’s list devoid of First Amendment protection readily 
encompasses these knowingly false statements.  The plurality suggests that “to the 
extent that [these examples] implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct,” 
they would be categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.  Id.  Notably, 
the plurality did not specify “the extent” to which these examples would implicate fraud 
or speech integral to criminal conduct.  And the clear implication is that to the extent 
these prohibitions do not implicate these exceptions, the plurality believed that the laws 
prohibiting them would pass strict scrutiny.  As regards the “speech integral to criminal 
conduct” exception noted by the plurality, I wholeheartedly agree with Volokh that this 
exception is “indeterminate, dangerous, and inconsistent with more recent cases.”  
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, 
“Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1285 
(2005).  The plurality’s suggestion that some of the speech in these three examples may 
be punishable under this exception proves Volokh’s point about the indeterminacy of 
that exception.  As to its dangerousness and inconsistency with current doctrine, the 
exception would seem to allow the punishment of speech urging draft resistance 
because such expression is integral to that crime. 
 74 At least not obviously so.  See supra note 73. 
 75 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724. 
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aptly described by Justice Breyer as leading to “near-automatic 
condemnation”76 and by Justice Antonin Scalia as “ordinarily the kiss of 
death.”77  This is as it should be.  Strict scrutiny properly poses a near-
absolute barrier to government regulating the content of public 
discourse, the speech by which citizens contribute to public opinion, 
which is “the final source of government in a democratic state.”78 
The function of phrases such as “compelling interest” and 
“narrowly drawn” is to establish a test that would allow Americans to 
say virtually anything they want on matters of public concern “to the 
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.”79  For 
this reason, strict scrutiny, at least as it now exists, will sometimes lead 
to the invalidation of laws “even though common sense may suggest that 
they are entirely reasonable.”80  Indeed, for the strict scrutiny test to 
adequately protect the right of the American people to govern 
themselves, a law should not survive such an exceedingly rigorous 
review just because it is reasonable.  As the very name of the test 
connotes, “strict scrutiny” is a much more rigorous test than a “rule of 
reason.”  A speech prohibition should survive such exacting scrutiny 
only where the speech prohibition is the only means available “to avert 
rare, catastrophic harms.”81  For that reason, the Supreme Court has 
explained that it is “the rare case” that survives strict scrutiny.82 
As of this writing, there are just two Supreme Court cases that 
remain good law in which a speech prohibition has survived such 
rigorous review.83  But if I am right that courts will uphold most, if not 
all, of the laws against knowing factual misstatement listed above, it 
would no longer be the “rare case” in which a law withstands such 
scrutiny.  As a result, the rigorous, near-absolute protection against 
content discrimination that is supposed to be provided by the “most 
exacting scrutiny” will be diluted.84  While prohibiting the knowing 
 
 76 See id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 77 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 78 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 79 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
 80 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 81 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1304 (2007).  
 82 See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (quoting Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 83 See Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. 433; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 
(2010). 
 84 Justice Breyer has similarly warned that giving too capacious a scope to strict 
scrutiny will result in “watering down the force” of the test, thereby “weaken[ing] the 
First Amendment’s protection in instances where ‘strict scrutiny’ should apply in full 
force.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring).   
WEINSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:58 PM 
2020] WHAT LIES AHEAD? 151 
falsehoods listed above may prevent harm, it is not the catastrophic 
harm that the government must demonstrate for a law to survive strict 
scrutiny.  Rather, many of these laws seek to prevent mundane harms in 
a way that “common sense may suggest . . . are entirely reasonable.”85  
But if strict scrutiny is to retain the rigor necessary to protect the right 
of Americans to express virtually any idea in public discourse, even 
dangerous ones, strict scrutiny must not be reduced to a reasonableness 
test.86 
If just the ten examples provided above,87 let alone the host of other 
regulating lies as well as careless falsehoods, were upheld under an 
enfeebled versions of strict scrutiny, such a development would breach 
a crucial bulwark against government suppression of dissent in this 
country.  Fortunately, the plurality’s wrongheaded approach was 
rejected by a majority of the Court in Alvarez, rendering it, for the time 
being at least, essentially a dissenting opinion of four Justices.  It is my 
fondest hope that this misguided approach never attracts a fifth vote. 
I now turn to the plurality’s use of the marketplace of ideas 
rationale to support its remarkable position that strict scrutiny should 
apply to all laws prohibiting knowingly false statements of fact on the 
basis of their content unless the lies in question happen to fall within 
one of the “few historic and traditional categories of speech” devoid of 
First Amendment protection.  It is one thing to maintain that the 
promotion of truth will be served by applying strict scrutiny to laws 
prohibiting certain categories of lies, such as those made about matters 
of public concern.  This is the position adopted by both Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion and Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, which I 
discuss in Section C., below.  But to suggest that the truth-promoting 
function of free speech will be promoted by a powerful presumption 
against the constitutionality of all laws prohibiting knowingly false 
statements, including lies that one has been awarded a military honor, 
is nothing short of preposterous. 
 
 85 Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60. 
 86 The potential of the plurality’s approach to weaken strict scrutiny is 
demonstrated by the two cases mentioned above, note 83,  that upheld content-based 
laws under that standard.  For a detailed discussion of the faux strict scrutiny the Court 
applied in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, see James Weinstein & Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Bad Law: How the United States Supreme Court Mishandled the Free Speech 
Issue in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, in EXTREMISM, FREE SPEECH AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 162–64 (Ian Cram ed. 2019).  Similarly, Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar demonstrates that the test that the majority applied in 
that case is but “the appearance of strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 87 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
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In addition to lies about being awarded a military honor, consider 
knowingly false statements that one has a university degree or 
professional license; slandering someone’s title by filing a knowingly 
false claim of ownership to property; supplying a social security number 
that one knows is fabricated; or, to use Holmes’ hoary example, 
“shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic”88 when the speaker knew 
that there was no fire.  Is there any plausible claim that laws prohibiting 
such lies might “chill” people from making truthful statements about 
these subjects?  And are we really to believe that these are the kind of 
false statements about which government cannot be trusted to fairly 
adjudicate their veracity, or which “may be deemed to make a valuable 
contribution to public debate” by producing a “clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by [their] collision with error”?89  
It is bad enough to interpret the First Amendment as imposing a strong 
presumption against laws prohibiting harmful lies about easily 
verifiable facts having nothing to do with matters of public concern.  But 
the claim that this rule will promote truth discovery cannot, and should 
not, be taken seriously.  If, as the Court had previously asserted, false 
statements of fact generally “interfere with the truth-seeking function of 
the marketplace of ideas,”90 then a First Amendment rule presuming 
unconstitutional laws prohibiting knowing falsehoods such as these 
cannot possibly promote this truth-seeking function. 
B.  The Concurring Opinion 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, filed a concurring 
opinion.91  Breyer agreed that the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional 
but objected to the plurality’s application of strict scrutiny.  He 
acknowledged that strict scrutiny and the “near-automatic 
condemnation” it entails would be the appropriate level of scrutiny for 
laws “restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, 
the social sciences, the arts, and the like.”92  With regard to such 
expression, Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Alito’s dissent that such 
restrictions “would present a grave and unacceptable danger of 
suppressing truthful speech.”93  In contrast, the Stolen Valor Act 
prohibited “false statements about easily verifiable facts that do not 
concern such subject matter,” statements that are “less likely . . . to make 
 
 88 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 89 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 733 (2012). 
 90 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 91 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730–39 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 92 Id. at 731. 
 93 Id. (quoting Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
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a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”94  However, 
because restrictions on false statements not involving such subject 
matter “can nonetheless threaten speech-related harms,” Breyer 
concluded that the application of “intermediate scrutiny” was called 
for.95 
Breyer conceded that the Court has often stated that false factual 
statements “enjoy little First Amendment protection.”96  Nevertheless, 
he insisted that, for several reasons, this cannot mean “no protection at 
all.”97  First, he noted that lies can “serve useful human objectives,” for 
example, “in social contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, 
protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with 
comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they 
may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger.”98 
In addition, in Breyer’s view, false factual statements “even if made 
deliberately to mislead,” can “promote a form of thought that ultimately 
helps realize the truth” or “bring[] about ‘the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’”99  
Furthermore, Breyer continued, criminal sanctions for making a false 
statement “can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, 
thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s 
heart.”100  Finally, Breyer feared that a broad prohibition on even 
deliberate misstatement of fact not closely tied to specific harms would 
allow for selective prosecution against members of “unpopular” groups, 
or at least make members of such groups apprehensive of such selective 
prosecution.101   
Breyer noted that the Stolen Valor Act “applies in family, social, or 
other private contexts, where lies will often cause little harm,” as well as 
in “political contexts, where although such lies are more likely to cause 
harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is also high.”102  
And unlike laws against fraud, perjury, false claims of terrorist attacks, 
or laws forbidding impersonation of public officials, the Stolen Valor Act 
does not require a showing that the false statement “caused specific 
 
 94 Id. at 732. 
 95 Id.  Justice Breyer explained that such scrutiny required “‘proportionality’ review” 
by which the Court determines “whether the statute works speech-related harm that is 
out of proportion to its justifications.”  Id. at 730. 
 96 Id. at 733. 
 97 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. (quoting ON LIBERTY, supra note 31, at 16). 
 100 Id. at 733. 
 101 Id. at 734. 
 102 Id. at 736. 
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harm or at least was material, or focus[ed] its coverage on lies most 
likely to be harmful or on contexts where such lies are most likely to 
cause harm.”103  For these reasons, he found that the Stolen Valor Act 
was not sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to pass intermediate scrutiny.104 
The argument that the Stolen Valor Act’s application to “family, 
social, or other private contexts” will inhibit would-be speakers “from 
making true statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at 
the First Amendment’s heart,” or otherwise impair the promotion of 
truth, itself cannot withstand scrutiny, “intermediate” or otherwise.  
Criminal prosecution for “bar stool braggadocio”105 about having been 
awarded a Purple Heart, or a father telling his young children that he 
was awarded the Silver Medal, would, it is true, infringe upon privacy 
and thus raise substantial constitutional issues.  But contrary to Justice 
Breyer’s surmise, such prosecutions would not likely have inhibited 
others from making true statements about their military honors.  Breyer 
contended that “given the potential haziness of individual memory 
along with the large number of military awards covered (ranging from 
medals for rifle marksmanship to the Congressional Medal of 
Honor),”106 there is “a risk of chilling that is not completely eliminated 
by the mens rea requirement[]” that the false statements must be “made 
with knowledge of their falsity and with the intent that they be taken as 
true.”107  In his view, someone who wanted to talk about his military 
honors in family, social, or other private settings might “still be worried 
about being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even if he does not 
have the intent required to render him liable.”108   
Justice Breyer may be right that the “risk of chilling” might not be 
“completely eliminated” by the mens rea requirement.  It is doubtful, 
though, that such a “chilling effect” would be substantial.  This is 
particularly true in the absence of a spate of prosecutions for false 
statements about military honors made in the familial and social 
contexts, which was the situation at the time Alvarez was decided.109  But 
 
 103 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 738. 
 104 Id. at 730. 
 105 Id. at 737 
 106 Id. at 736. 
 107 Id. at 732. 
 108 Id. at 736. 
 109 Prosecutions for violating the Stolen Valor Act were “rare.”  United States v. 
Perelman, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1233 (D. Nev. 2010), aff’d, 695 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2012).  
Many of those prosecuted lied about military honors in order to fraudulently collect VA 
benefits.  See, e.g., United States v. Amster, 484 F. App’x 338, 340 (11th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Perelman, 658 F.3d 1134, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011); McClain v. Shinseki, No. 11-
0160, 2012 WL 641606, at *3 (Vet. App. Feb. 28, 2012); United States v. Swisher, 790 F. 
Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Idaho 2011). 
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let’s assume for the sake of argument that the Stolen Valor Act would 
likely have inhibited a substantial number of people unsure of which 
military honors they were awarded from speaking on the subject for 
fear of prosecution for making a “careless false statement.”  Even under 
this assumption, it is not at all clear that such speech inhibition would 
have reduced the number of true statements about military honors.  
While such speech inhibition would deter some speakers unsure about 
their military honors from making true statements, such a “chilling 
effect” would also deter them from making false statements.  Indeed, for 
all we (or Justice Breyer) know, a law that made people more cautious 
in making claims about whose veracity they were uncertain would, in 
this context, promote truth by deterring more false statements than true 
ones.  As Justice Breyer had earlier emphasized, whether or not one has 
been awarded a military honor involves “readily verifiable facts within 
the personal knowledge of the speaker.”110  So if a speaker, unsure of 
which military honor she had won, was forced to “bite her tongue” on a 
particular occasion, she could subsequently verify her award and 
thereafter speak freely and truthfully on the subject.111   
Justice Breyer’s argument that the Stolen Valor Act’s prohibition in 
“political contexts” will diminish true statements about military honors 
is similarly unpersuasive.  By “political contexts,” he seems to mean lies 
in electoral politics.  He thus refers to false statements 
“leading . . . listeners to vote for [a] speaker” and to prosecutions for 
such statements “radically changing a potential election result,” and 
discusses at some length false statements by political candidates and 
their organizations.112  His main concern here is the high “risk of 
 
 110 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 111 It is fanciful to suggest, as does Justice Breyer, that lies in the private context about 
having been awarded a military honor will “bring[] about ‘the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’”  Id. at 733 (quoting J. 
MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Blackwell ed. 1947)).  The claim that such lies in this context will 
“promote a form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth,” in contrast, raises an 
interesting issue.  Id.  I must confess that about twenty years ago while reading my then 
four-year son a Harry Potter novel, I claimed (falsely) that I went to Hogwarts.  I told 
him this lie mostly for the fun of it, but also to engage and improve his critical thinking 
skills.  As I recall, the conversation continued something like this: “Really, daddy?” my 
son asked quizzically.  “So what do you think, Julian?  Did I really go to Hogwarts?”  Julian 
thought hard about the question for a moment and then replied: “Nah, I don’t think so 
. . . but maybe.”  Perhaps a lot of parents lie to their children to “promote a form of 
thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.”  But taking lies about military honors off 
the table as a subject matter for honing children’s critical thinking skills will not 
significantly impair such bedtime or dinner table dialogues.   
 112 See id. at 738.  Earlier in his opinion, Breyer mentions a hypothetical selective 
prosecution against a pacifist who supports this cause by falsely claiming to have been 
awarded a military honor.  See id. at 734.  Although such expression might commonly be 
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censorious selectivity by prosecutors.”113  I agree that there are 
persuasive reasons to distrust government officials’ ability to fairly 
punish false statements, including deliberately false ones, in electoral 
politics.  State and local prosecutors and election officials typically have 
intimate ties to partisan politics.  Accordingly, even when easily 
verifiable facts are at issue, there is considerable risk that these officials 
selectively will punish candidates of other parties for campaign lies, 
while overlooking similar lies by candidates from their party.  Perhaps 
at one time, federal prosecutors could be trusted not to bring 
prosecutions to try to influence the outcome of elections.  But I have 
much less confidence that this is true in today’s highly polarized 
environment. 
I, therefore, agree with Justice Breyer that the Stolen Valor Act 
presented a substantial risk that it would be selectively applied to 
candidates for elective office, both state and federal, who lie about 
having been awarded military honors.  It does not follow, however, that 
selective prosecutions in the political context would result, as Justice 
Breyer claims, will “inhibit the speaker from making true statements, 
thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s 
heart.”114   
Suppose that over several election cycles, sixteen candidates for 
elective office, eight Republicans and eight Democrats, make knowingly 
false claims about having been awarded military honors.  Suppose 
further that because of selective prosecution, only those from one party 
were prosecuted.  This would be a serious problem for the fairness of 
electoral politics with troubling constitutional ramifications.  Moreover, 
to the extent a candidate must divert time and resources to defend 
against these charges, such selective prosecution might skew the 
information and ideas available to the electorate and, in that sense, may 
be said to interfere with the marketplace of ideas.  It is difficult to 
imagine, however, that inhibiting even careless, let alone knowing, 
misstatements from candidates that they have been awarded military 
honors would diminish truth about that subject.  Rather, such inhibition 
would more likely promote truth discovery.  Indeed, even more so with 
private “bar stool braggadocio” or claims to one’s family, concern for 
prosecution would likely spur candidates for public office to check the 
details of an award about which they were uncertain, and thus to make 
accurate statements on the subject.  Of course, even-handedly 
 
referred to as “political speech,” it does not seem to be what Breyer means by speech in 
“political contexts.”   
 113 Id. at 736. 
 114 Id. at 733. 
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prosecuting candidates who lie about military honors would likely 
further increase this truth promoting function.  But even selective 
prosecution would seem to promote, not diminish, the truth about who 
has been awarded military honors and which honors they were 
awarded.115 
In sum, Justice Breyer makes some valid points about possible 
unconstitutional applications of the Stolen Valor Act.  But in following 
the alluring scent of the marketplace of ideas rationale, he ends up 
barking up the wrong tree.116 
C.  The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas, 
dissented.  Essentially adopting the Government’s approach to the 
case,117 Alito emphasized the many occasions in which the Court had 
recognized that “false factual statements possess no intrinsic First 
Amendment value”118 and so “do not merit First Amendment protection 
for their own sake.”119  He recognized, however, that “it is sometimes 
necessary to ‘exten[d] a measure of strategic protection’ to these 
statements in order to ensure sufficient ‘breathing space’ for protected 
speech.”120  After noting the application of such “strategic protection” in 
defamation and similar cases,121 Alito cautioned that these examples “by 
no means exhaust the circumstances in which false factual statements 
enjoy a degree of instrumental constitutional protection.”122  To the 
contrary, he noted that there are “broad areas” in which “any attempt by 
the state to penalize purportedly false speech would present a grave and 
unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.”123  Such a threat, 
 
 115 For similar reasons, selective prosecution of “unpopular” people or groups such 
as pacifists who falsely claim to have been awarded military honors, see id. at 734, while 
raising troubling constitutional issues, would not seem to diminish the promotion of 
truth about who has earned military honors.   
 116 In finding the Act facially unconstitutional Justice Breyer indicated that “a more 
finely tailored statute” might comport with the First Amendment.  Alvarez, 567 U.S.  
at 737–38.  Soon after Alvarez was decided, Congress passed, and President Barack 
Obama signed, the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-12, 127 Stat. 448.  This law, 
which applies to a shorter list of military honors than did the invalidated law, makes it 
a crime with “intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit” to 
“fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be a recipient” of one of the listed honors.  Id. 
 117 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 118 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 746 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 119 Id. at 750. 
 120 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
 121 Id. at 750–51. 
 122 Id. at 751. 
 123 Id. 
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for example, would be presented by laws “restricting false statements 
about philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts and 
other matters of public concern.”124  In these areas, it is “perilous to 
permit the state to be the arbiter of truth” because  
[e]ven where there is a wide scholarly consensus concerning 
a particular matter, the truth is served by allowing that 
consensus to be challenged without fear of reprisal.  Today’s 
accepted wisdom sometimes turns out to be mistaken.  And in 
these contexts, “[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to 
make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings 
about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, 
produced by its collision with error.’”125 
In the dissent’s view, however, in “stark contrast” to “laws 
prohibiting false statements about history, science, and similar 
matters,” the speech prohibited by Stolen Valor Act “is not only 
verifiably false” but is also lacking in either intrinsic or instrumental 
First Amendment value.126  The law in his view, therefore, “presents no 
risk at all that valuable speech will be suppressed.”127  Finding the Stolen 
Valor Act to be “a narrow law enacted to address an important problem,” 
and one that “presents no threat to freedom of expression,” Alito would 
have upheld the law.128 
While there are other aspects of the dissent that are open to 
criticism,129 I want to focus on the claim, echoed in Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence, that “any attempt by the state . . . to restrict false 
statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the 
arts and other matters of public concern, would present a grave and 
unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.”130  This claim 
reflects the classic marketplace of ideas premise that any attempt by 
 
 124 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 125 Id. at 752 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) 
(quoting ON LIBERTY, supra note 31, at 15)).  Alito also contended that allowing the state 
to punish false statements in this context would risk the state using its power for 
political ends.  Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 755. 
 129 In particular, it fails to fully engage the plurality’s and concurrence’s point that the 
Act applies in private settings and the concurrence’s observation that it applies in 
political contexts.  See infra text accompanying notes 157–62.  The dissent brushes aside 
these claims by insisting that such application to protected speech would not render the 
law unconstitutional as substantially overbroad.  Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 753 (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  It also fails to consider whether the context in which Alvarez lied about 
winning the Congressional Medal of Honor warranted First Amendment protection of 
this expression.  See infra note 147.   
 130 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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government to restrict expression on matters of public concern will 
diminish truth promotion.  In addition, it is a view shared by all nine 
members of the Alvarez Court.131  I do not doubt that allowing 
government unconstrained power to restrict false statements in public 
discourse would be unacceptably destructive of core free speech values.  
What is not so certain, however, is whether permitting government to 
engage in such speech repression would significantly reduce truth 
discovery.  This is a question to which I will return momentarily.  But 
first I want to challenge the broad assertion that any restriction of false 
statements “on matters of public concern” poses a “grave and 
unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.” 
Consider Holocaust denial, a notorious falsehood that would seem 
to be the type of statement that Justice Alito had in mind when claiming 
that “restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the 
social sciences, the arts and other matters of public concern would 
present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful 
speech.”132  A 2008 European Union Framework Decision requires 
member states to punish as hate speech the “publicly condoning, 
denying, or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide,” including the 
Holocaust, as criminal offenses.133  Twenty-two member states 
currently have laws punishing Holocaust denial, and prosecutions 
under these laws are not infrequent.134  It is true that “[e]ven where 
there is a wide scholarly consensus concerning a particular matter . . . 
[t]oday’s accepted wisdom sometimes turns out to be mistaken.”135  But 
with certain basic historical facts, such as the Allies won World War II 
and that during that war the Nazis committed massive genocide against 
the Jewish people, there is no chance that “the wide scholarly 
consensus” is going to “turn[] out to be mistaken.”  Of course, even with 
such irrefutable historical facts, there are always contested details that 
need to be worked out.  But I have not been able to discover any 
evidence that the ban on Holocaust denial in Europe has interfered with 
legitimate academic inquiry or other discussion that is likely to promote 
a more accurate understanding of the details of the Holocaust.   
 
 131 It is expressly adopted by the concurrence, 567 U.S. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring), 
and is entailed in the plurality’s view much broader protection of false factual 
statements in order to promote truth.  Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).   
 132 Id. at 751 (emphasis added). 
 133 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on Combating 
Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law, 
art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 328) 55. 
 134 See Michael Whine, Countering Holocaust Denial in the Twenty-First Century, 14 
ISR. J. OF FOREIGN AFF. 53, 55–58, 64 n.3 (2020). 
 135 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 752 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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Of course, this does not mean that some useful dissent about 
various details of the Holocaust has not been deterred, just that it has 
not been reported.  In addition, it may be that the prohibitions on 
Holocaust denial have, to some extent, reduced “the clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”136  
Relatedly, that the government has forbidden Holocaust denial has no 
doubt for some people only served to reinforce their erroneous belief 
that the Holocaust is a “hoax.”  On the other hand, to the extent that these 
laws have deterred Holocaust deniers from sowing seeds of doubt, 
particularly online, among the European population about the existence 
of the Holocaust, the speech restrictions may have, on the whole, 
produced a more accurate understanding of the truth on the subject.  
What the net effect of these laws has been on truth promotion is difficult 
to say.  But there is no reason to assume this overall effect has been truth 
reduction rather than truth promotion. 
For similar reasons, the net effect on truth promotion would be 
uncertain if making other manifestly false factual statements in public 
discourse were outlawed.  These include smoking does not cause 
cancer,137 vaccinations cause autism,138 human activity has not 
contributed to climate change,139 or various conspiracy theories that 
 
 136 Id. at 752 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964)) 
(quoting ON LIBERTY, supra note 31, at 15) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO EXPLAINED: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
. . . IN ITS OWN WORDS 6 (2019) https://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/Tobacco
Explained.pdf?ua=1 (“Publicly the [tobacco] industry denied and continues to deny that 
it is clear that smoking causes lung cancer—yet it has understood the carcinogenic 
nature of its product since the 1950s.”).  
 138 The origin of this false belief is a subsequently retracted publication by English 
physician Andrew Wakefield claiming the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine 
caused autism in 12 children.  See Andrew Wakefield, Ileal-lymphoid-nodular 
Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 
THE LANCET 637 (1998), retraction published 375 THE LANCET 445 (2010).  The study was 
retracted when journalists discovered that Wakefield had failed to disclose that he had 
applied for a patent on his own vaccine and had been paid by lawyers who were suing 
manufacturers of MMR vaccines for downplaying the side effects of these vaccines.  
Shortly thereafter, the British General Medical Council revoked Wakefield’s license to 
practice medicine, whereupon he moved to Texas, where he continued his anti-
vaccination campaign.  See Why People Think Vaccines Cause Autism, Immunization
Info.com, https://www.immunizationinfo.com/why-people-think-vaccines-cause- 
autism (last visited September 5, 2020).  Subsequent to the retraction of Wakefield’s 
Lancet article, multiple studies have shown that there is no link between vaccines and 
autism.  Vaccine Safety: Autism, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention (March 26, 
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html.   
 139 See, e.g., Tom DiChristopher, Trump Revives a Misleading Claim That Global 
Warming Isn’t Happening Because It’s Cold Outside, CNBC (Dec. 29, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/29/trump-revives-misleading-claim-its-cold-so-
global-warming-isnt-real.html.  The evidence that the has warmed significantly since the 
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have proliferated about the origins of the novel coronavirus.140  It would 
require a leap of faith to confidently conclude that the overall effect of 
prohibiting these false statements would be to impair the promotion of 
truth about these subjects.  
Significantly, however, in assessing the overall impact on truth 
promotion, it is not sufficient to consider the impact of each law viewed 
in isolation.  From a doctrinal perspective, a crucial question is what, if 
any, limiting principle can be identified that would permit the 
imposition of liability for the false statement at issue but would not give 
government unbounded power to punish false statements in public 
discourse.  In theory, one such limiting principle would be whether 
there is any realistic chance that the claim might “turn out” to be true.  
But while this may be a workable criterion for academic administrators 
to use in deciding which research projects to fund or which faculty 
should be granted tenure, it is not one with which government in the 
United States can be trusted.   
 
late nineteenth century is “unequivocal.”  See Facts, NASA: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/; see also Rebecca Lindsey & LuAnn Dahlman, 
Climate Change: Global Temperature, NOAA: CLIMATE.GOV (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-
global-temperature (discussing evidence showing that “the combined land and ocean 
temperature has increased at an average rate of 0.07°C (0.13°F) per decade since 1880” 
but that “the average rate of increase since 1981 (0.18°C / 0.32°F) is more than twice as 
great”).  Even many climate change “skeptics” now agree that it indisputable that the 
earth has warmed over this period.  See, e.g., Vijay Jayaraj, Four Reasons Alarmists Are 
Wrong on Climate Change, MASTERRESOURCE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.master
resource.org/alarmism/four-reasons-alarmists-wrong-climate-change/ (“[The]  
historical data inferred . . . primarily tree-rings and ice cores [,] global mean surface 
temperature data from thermometers (measured since the 1880s), radiosonde 
(weather balloon) temperature measurements (first used in 1896 but not common until 
the 1950s), and temperature data gathered by satellites (since the 1970s)” all show that 
[g]lobal warming is real. Scientists disagree only on its magnitude and causes and how 
we should respond to it.”).  
 140 For example, it has been widely claimed that 5G wireless networks caused the 
coronavirus pandemic.  Bruce Y. Lee, 5G Networks and Covid-19 Coronavirus: Here Are 
the Latest Conspiracy Theories, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
brucelee/2020/04/09/5g-networks-and-covid-19-coronavirus-here-are-the-latest-
conspiracy-theories/#531ca02e6d41 (“[T]his theory claims that the radiation from 5G 
is what’s actually causing COVID-19 symptoms.  Another variation of the conspiracy 
theory asserts that radiation from 5G can weaken your immune system to the point that 
you are more easily infected by the COVID-19 coronavirus.”).  There is no scientific 
evidence for either of these claims.  See Peter Grad, Report Linking 5G to COVID-19 Swiftly 
Debunked, MEDICALXPRESS (July 27, 2020), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-07-
linking-5g-covid-swiftly-debunked.html; Rebecca Heilweil, How the 5G Coronavirus 
Conspiracy Theory Went from Fringe to Mainstream, VOX: RECODE (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/24/21231085/coronavirus-5g-conspiracy-
theory-covid-facebook-youtube (explaining how 5G misinformation spread across the 
internet).  
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If federal, state, and local governments in the United States were 
allowed to penalize factual statements on matters of public concern that 
in their judgment were indisputably false, there would indeed be a great 
risk of “censorious selectivity by prosecutors.”141  This would create a 
“grave and unacceptable danger” that government would target such 
false statements by speakers with whom it disagrees while not 
prosecuting similar falsehoods by those with whom it agrees.  Worse 
yet, driven by ideology or ignorance, or a lethal combination of the two, 
legislators and prosecutors would likely seek to punish seemingly false 
factual assertions that may well “turn out” to be true.  It is no answer 
that the judiciary could be trusted to invalidate laws that punished 
seemingly false statements that had some realistic chance of eventually 
turning out to be true.  This is much too uncertain a standard for 
practical administration, and as such would invite judges, even if quite 
unconsciously, to smuggle their political ideology into the decision.  In 
any event, such a standard would fail to provide the “breathing space” 
necessary to avoid “chilling” true factual statements. 
In sum, I am doubtful that there is some readily identifiable, 
practically administrable principle to distinguish false statements 
about, say, vaccinations causing autism, from the host of other false 
statements routinely made on highly contentious and politicized 
matters of public concerns, such as abortion,142 health care policy,143 or 
police brutality against African-Americans.144  Justice Alito was right to 
 
 141 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 142 See Marie McCullough, The Facts Behind ‘Partial-Birth’ Debate: As the Senate 
Prepares to Take up the Abortion Issue Again, Some Questions Are Answered, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 16, 1998, at A01, A14 (noting that Ron Fitzsimmons, executive 
director of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers, confessed that he had “lied 
through his teeth” in claiming that partial-birth abortions are only rarely performed); 
Sidney Steele, Nick Schroer Wrong that More Women Have Died From Legal Abortions 
Since Roe v. Wade, POLITIFACT (Apr. 25, 2019) (statement that more women died from 
illegal abortions after Roe rated as a “Pants On Fire”), https://www.politifact.com/
factchecks/2019/apr/25/nick-schroer/nick-schroer-wrong-more-women-have-died-
legal-abor/. 
 143 See Jon Greenberg, Nancy Pelosi Says ‘Everybody’ Will Get More and Pay Less Under 
the Health Care Law, POLITIFACT (July 6, 2012) (House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi’s 
statement that under the ACA, “[e]verybody will have lower rates, better quality and 
better access” rated as “False”), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2012/jul/06/
nancy-pelosi/nancy-pelosi-says-everybody-will-get-more-and-pay-/; Sharon Begley, 
The Top 5 Lies About Obama’s Health Care Reform, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 2009 (refuting 
claims that “death panels” would decide who receives care under the Affordable Care 
Act), https://www.newsweek.com/top-5-lies-about-obamas-health-care-reform-788
95. 
 144 Nick Gass, ‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ Ranked One of Biggest ‘Pinocchios’ of 2015, 
POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2015, 08:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/hands-
up-dont-shoot-false-216736; Fact Check: False Claims about George Soros, REUTERS (June 
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be concerned about the impact on truth promotion if government were 
allowed broad power to punish false factual statements in public 
discourse.  That being said, such laws would also deter a lot of plainly 
false speech, much of which reliably deceives a huge portion of the 
American population “increasingly siloed in their own echo 
chambers.”145  So even if government in the United States were 
essentially unconstrained by the First Amendment from penalizing 
“purportedly false speech”146 on matters of public concern, it is 
significant that it could not be said with certainty that the “net” effect of 
such unconstrained speech prohibitions would be to diminish rather 
than to promote truth.147   
D.  Free Speech Values that Would be Impaired by Laws Prohibiting 
Lies in Public Discourse 
What can, however, be said with confidence is that such unbounded 
governmental power to punish falsehoods in public discourse would 
seriously undermine freedom of expression in the United States.  A far 
more “grave and unacceptable danger” to free speech than the uncertain 
effect that these restrictions might have on truth promotion is the dire 
consequences to two core democratic values underlying the First 
Amendment.  The first is the right of speakers to engage in public 
discourse.  The second is a basic precept of American popular 
 
18, 2020, 12:11 PM) (debunking claims that George Soros owned ANTIFA and Black 
Lives Matter and paid protestors), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-
false-george-soros-claims/fact-checkfalseclaims-about-george-soros-idUSKBN23P2XJ. 
 145 Nunziato, supra note 5, at 1527–28. 
 146 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 147 For the most part, both Alito and Breyer cast their discussion of laws that prohibit 
false factual statements in public discourse as pure dicta.  Indeed, Breyer explicitly states 
that “this case does not involve such as law.”  567 U.S. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
the judgment).  But as is suggested by Breyer’s hypothetical about selective prosecution 
of a pacifist who in promoting this cause falsely claims to have been awarded a military 
honor, id. at 734, the Stolen Valor Act certainly could have had some application to public 
discourse.  Indeed, the very speech that sparked the prosecution in this case—Alvarez’s 
claim at a public meeting of a water board of which he was a member that he had been 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor—might qualify as public discourse.  Or, 
since members of the board are elected, see Three Valleys’ Service Area and Elected 
Officials’ Divisions, THREE VALLEYS MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT—BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 
https://www.threevalleys.com/board-of-directors, it might qualify as expression in a 
“political context[],” see 567 U.S. at 738 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  The 
context of Alvarez’s speech thus sharply raised the issue of whether the Stolen Valor Act 
violated the First Amendment as applied to such expression.  Since Justice Breyer found 
the Act unconstitutional on its face, he might be forgiven for failure to discuss this issue.  
In contrast, Justice Alito, who thought the law was facially valid, should have grappled 
with the issue. 
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sovereignty that “We the People” do not need government guardianship 
to sort out truth from falsity on matters of public concern. 
Participation in public discourse is a crucial means by which 
citizens in a democracy contribute to the public opinion that controls 
their representatives between elections.  Like voting, the opportunity of 
each citizen to participate freely and equally in public discourse is vital 
to the legitimacy of the legal system in that it allows individuals to have 
their say about laws that bind them.148  In addition to promoting 
legitimacy in this essential normative sense, the opportunity to 
participate in public discourse contributes to “the descriptive 
conditions necessary for a diverse and heterogeneous population to live 
together in a relatively peaceable manner under a common system of 
governance and politics.”149  The opportunity to engage in such 
expression promotes not just the legitimacy of the entire legal system, 
but also the legitimacy of particular laws.  For instance, legal restrictions 
on those who are dubious about climate change will undermine the 
legitimacy of applying to them environmental legislation enacted to 
reduce global warming. 
If government had broad power to punish false statements made 
on matters of public concern, speakers would inevitably be penalized 
for making statements that they in good faith thought were true.  
Whether or not this would diminish truth promotion, such inhibition on 
the ability of citizens to freely participate in the speech by which we 
govern ourselves would significantly impair the core legitimating 
function of free speech.  It is unlikely, moreover, that these baneful 
effects could be sufficiently mitigated by a mens rea requirement 
limiting prosecutions to only false statements made with knowledge of 
their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.  Concededly, democratic 
participation does not, as a theoretical matter, entitle a speaker to try to 
deceive the public by making knowingly false factual statements.  But in 
the often highly ideological context of public discourse, there are strong 
pragmatic reasons to distrust the ability of government officials to fairly 
and accurately determine a speaker’s state of mind in making a false 
statement.  Government officials hostile to the speaker’s point of view 
are more likely to believe that the speaker knew that the statement was 
false, while officials who share the speaker’s ideological perspective will 
 
 148 For a fuller discussion of how the opportunity to participate in public discourse 
as speakers promotes political legitimacy, see James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, 
Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017) and James 
Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 361 (2011) [hereinafter, Weinstein, Political Legitimacy]. 
 149 Robert Post, Legitimacy and Hate Speech, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 651, 651 (2017). 
WEINSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:58 PM 
2020] WHAT LIES AHEAD? 165 
be more likely to find that any misstatement of fact was an innocent 
one.150   
So Justice Breyer was right to emphasize the problem of selective 
prosecution, but not because it would undermine truth promotion.  Such 
“censorious selectivity” might or might not interfere with truth 
promotion; it cannot be doubted, however, that selectively prosecuting 
those with whose speech the government disagrees violates the core 
democratic precept of equal participation in the political process in 
much the same way as would selective denial of the franchise.151  
Similarly, the Court in Alvarez was correct with respect to one of the few 
points all nine Justices agreed upon: As a general matter, it is too 
dangerous to allow government to punish even knowing misstatements 
of fact made by speakers on matters of public concern.  But a much 
better explanation of the mischief of such speech repression than its 
effect on truth promotion is its damage to political legitimacy.   
A second core democratic value underlying the First Amendment 
also supports the Court’s conclusion that the First Amendment should 
generally foreclose government from punishing lies in public discourse.  
As James Madison explained, “[t]he people, not the government, possess 
the absolute sovereignty.”152  The First Amendment presumes that as 
the ultimate governors of society, we are rational agents capable of 
sorting out truth from falsity without government supervision.  As 
Justice Robert Jackson eloquently explained more than seventy years 
ago: “The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public 
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind . . . . In this 
field, every person must be his own watchman for truth . . . .”153  Justice 
Kennedy echoed this view in Alvarez when he wrote: “Our constitutional 
tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of 
Truth.”154 
 
 150 For a more detailed discussion of this concern, see James Weinstein, Climate 
Change Disinformation, Citizen Competence, and the First Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 
341, 351–52 (2018). 
 151 For a discussion of the core democratic precept of equal participation underlying 
the First Amendment, see Weinstein, Political Legitimacy, supra note at 148, at 369–70. 
 152 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
569–70 (1863). 
 153 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).  For a more 
detailed discussion of the precept that the people must be considered in the sovereign 
capacity capable of sorting out truth from falsehoods, see Weinstein, supra note 150,  
at 361–64.  
 154 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN 
EIGHTY-FOUR (1949)).  Justice Kennedy, alas, does not limit this nifty dictum to citizens 
acting in their capacity as sovereign. 
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This is not to say, of course, that humans in general, or the 
American populace in particular, are, in fact, fully rational.  Rather, the 
attribution of rationality to participants engaging in public discourse is 
not a description but rather an ascription.  For no other view would 
comport with the premise that the people are capable of self-
governance and thus able to evaluate the veracity of statements relevant 
to decisions to be made in our role as ultimate sovereign.155  On this 
view, then, government prohibiting false statements because it fears we 
might be misled about some matter of public concern presents not just 
the pragmatic difficulties I just emphasized in my discussion of 
speakers’ democratic interests; it would also, in principle, violate the 
core precept of American popular sovereignty.156  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
United States v. Alvarez vividly demonstrates the bizarre hold that 
the marketplace of ideas rationale has on American free speech 
jurisprudence and the Justices of the United States Supreme Court.  The 
concern that a law prohibiting a specific category of knowingly false, 
readily verifiable factual statements would impede the promotion of 
truth seems oddly misplaced.  Yet, as if in the thrall of some strange spell, 
all nine Justices focused upon precisely that value in Alvarez.  Even more 
problematically, the undue influence of the marketplace of ideas 
rationale seems to have distracted the Justices from considering two 
more pertinent free speech rationales.  As Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
emphasized, the Stolen Valor Act “applies in family, social, or other 
private contexts, where lies will often cause little harm.”157  Similarly, 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion noted that the Act applied to 
“personal, whispered conversations within a home.”158  Regulation of 
speech in this context plainly implicates individual autonomy, a value of 
often ascribed as a core First Amendment norm.159  Breyer also noted 
 
 155 In contrast, when we are acting in capacities other than ultimate sovereign, such 
as consumer, government can treat us in accord with our actual, descriptive rational 
capacity.  Thus, with respect to commercial advertising, government can properly shield 
us from false or misleading speech.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–41.   
 156 This view is not inconsistent with cases affording less than full immunity to 
defamatory statements in public discourse.  In those cases, the Court upholds the 
legitimate state interest in redressing reputational injury to individuals, not 
paternalistic concern to prevent the people from being misled by false statements about 
some decision within our bailiwick as ultimate sovereign.   
 157 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 736 (plurality opinion). 
 158 Id. at 722. 
 159 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); Martin H. 
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 625–29 (1982); Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1158–85 (2003).  For an 
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that the law applies in “political contexts,160 where although such lies 
are more likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by 
prosecutors is also high.”161  And as his example of a pacifist who falsely 
claims to have been awarded a military honor in promoting this cause 
reveals, the law also applies to public discourse,162 a context in which 
both Breyer and the dissent agree that lies should be afforded First 
Amendment protection.  Punishing lies about military honors in 
electoral politics or public discourse obviously implicates the core 
democratic value underlying the First Amendment.  Rather than 
focusing on truth promotion and the marketplace of ideas, a free speech 
value at most weakly implicated by the Stolen Valor Act, it would have 
been far more useful if the Court had analyzed the law’s effect on the 
autonomy and democracy bases for free speech.  To paraphrase Justice 
Brandeis’ wise observation, “[t]o reach sound conclusions” about free 
speech, “we must bear in mind why” we have a First Amendment in the 
first place.163  
 
 
argument that autonomy is not, as a descriptive matter, a core First Amendment value, 
see Weinstein, supra note 14, at 502–04. 
 160 By which he seems to mean electoral politics.  See supra text accompanying note 
113. 
 161 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 162 Id. at 734.  
 163 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
